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[Crim. No. 6846. In Bank. Nov. 16, 1961.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, v. STANLEY
WILLIAM FITZGERALD, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Bomicide-Instructions-Verdict.-The court did not err in
instructing the jury that it must either acquit defendant of
the charge of murder or find him guilty of first degree murder
as against the objection that the jury might conceivably have
found him innocent of robbery but criminally responsible for
the victim's death and that, under proper instructions, he
might have been convicted of a lesser crime than first degree
murder, where this possibility was foreclosed by the jury's
verdict of guilty on the charge of robbery, the victim's companion testified that defendant killed the victim during the
course of the robbery, and, j.n finding defendant guilty of both
robbery and murder, the jury necessalily determined that the
killing was perpetrated during commission of the robbery.

McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 235; [2] Criminal Law,
§475; [3] Homicide, §111; [4] Criminal Law, §1363; [5] Criminal Law, § 287(3); [6, 9, 10] Criminal Law, § 816; [7] Criminal
Law, §459; [8] Criminal Law, §443; [11] Criminal Law, §1434;
[12] Criminal Law, § 1407(7); [13] Criminal Law, § 1092; [14]
Criminal Law, § 264; [15] Criminal Law, § 337.
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[2] Criminal Law - Evidence - Confessions - Proof. - Oral confessions and admissions, not in writing and signed by defendant, may be proved by the testimony of any person who was
present and heard the declarations when they were made.
[S] Homicide-Evidence-Statements of Accused.-Extrajudicinl
declarations made by defendant to the sheriff in a murder and
robbery case were properly admitted where there was ample
evidence that they were voluntary, defendant made no objection to their admission, and, when the sheriff was questioned,
defendant's counsel rejected the prosecutor's invitation to
examine the sheriff as to whether defendant's declarations
were voluntary.
[4] Criminal Law-Appeal-Ha.rmless Error-Order of ProofRebuttal.-Although the prosecution in a murder and robbery
ease should have introdueed certain extrajudicial and incriminating declarations of defendant as part of its case in chief,
their admission as rebuttal did not prejudice defendant where
there was no claim that there was any surprise, and where,
even if objection had been made, the trial court would not
have abused its discretion by admitting the evidence in rebuttal.
[5] Id. - Order of Proof - Rebuttal. - Evidence of extrajudicial
statements by defendant, introduced after he has taken the
stand, is not limited to impeachment of defendant, but may
be considered as proof of the People's ease.
[6] Id.-Instructions-Admissions and Confessions.-The court in
a murder and robbery ease did not "label" defendant's extrajudicial declarations as a confession where part of an instruction defined confessions and the other part defined admissions,
and the court left to the jury their classification, as well as
the weight to be given them regardless of their classification.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Definition.-A confession leaves
nothing to be determined in that it is a declaration of defendant's intentional participation in a criminal act.
[8] Id. - Evidence - Admissions - Definition. - An admission is
merely a recital of facts that tend to establish guilt.
[9] Id.-Instructions-Admissions and Confessions.-The court in
a murder and robbery case correctly instructed the jury that,
to be considered a confession, a statement must be one which,
if true, discloses defendant's guilt of the crime and excludes
the possibility of a reasonable inference to the contrary, and
that· an admission is a declaration which, by itself, is not
sufficient, even if true, to warrant an inference of guilt, but
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 430; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 530
et seq.
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 421; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 478. ,
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which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest of the
evidence, where defendant's declarations conld properly be
regarded as confessions of robbery and assault with a deadly
weapon, but only admissions to the charge of murder.
[10] Id.-Instructions-Admissions.-It is improper to instruct the
. jury that an admission can be considered, even if involuntary.
[11] IeL-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions---Admissions.Error in instructing the jury in a murder and robbery case
that an admission could be considered, even if involuntary,
was not prejudicial where there was no substantial evidence
in the record to support defendant's contention that the declarations were involuntary, and there was testimony of both
defendant and the sheriff, to whom the declarations were made,
that they were free and voluntary.
[12] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Where the prosecutor in a murder and robbery
ease referred to defendant's having "stolen" a ear for a trip
to Reno, and defendant properly objected, the court's correction of the prosecutor and indication to the jury that the
reference was improper precluded any prejudice therefrom.
[IS] IeL - Appeal- Objections - Conduct of Counsel. - Any impropriety of the prosecutor during his cross-examination of
defendant in a murder and robbery case in implying that
defendant had lied to the owner of a ear concerning the
presence of the murder weapon in the glove compartment, that
the prosecutor implied that defendant had stolen the gun
from another friend, and that, by his statements on several
occasions, the prosecutor evinced a personal dislike for or
mistrust of defendant could have been cured, on timely objection, by retraction of the prosecutor or instruction of the
court.
[14] Id.-Trial-Daily Transcript.-It was not error for the pro~e
cutor to secure a daily transcript, whereas defendant was not
provided with such a transcript, where defendant was given
a transcript as soon as he requested it.
[15] Id.-Jury-Separation-Before Submission of Cause.-Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that improper influence and prejudice resulted from conversations between
jurors and spectators and members of the sheriff's office before
submission of the case to the jury, and where defendant does
not know what the alleged conversations were about it cannot
be presumed that they related to the trial or that the jurors
were influenced by them.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Nevada
County Rnd from an order denying a new trial. Vernon Stoll,
Judge. Affirmed.
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Prosecution for murder and robbery. Judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty, affirmed.
Perry M. Farmer, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
.Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree, and the jury fixed the penalty at death. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
In a San Francisco bar on the evening of August 2, 1960,
defendant overheard M. J. Young and George Bonn, the
deceased, discuss a possible trip to Reno, Nevada, to gamble.
He offered to drive them there, and they left San Francisco
the following morning in a car driven by defendant that he
had obtained from a friend.
Several miles east of Truckee they left the main highway.
Defendant testified that he suggested the detour to show the
other two men a good deer hunting area. Young testified that
defendant said he wanted to find a certain ranch to see a
prospective purchaser of a tractor.
Young's testimony and defendant's are in sharp conflict as
to what happened after they finally stopped. According to
Young, defendant took a .22 caliber pistol from the glove
compartment of the car, forced Bonn and Young to removc
their trousers, and then rifled their pockets. Several hours
later, as defendant was making ready to leave the scene of the
robbery, Bonn struck him from behind with a whiskey bottle,
and Young attempted to seize the gun. Defendant, dazed but
not unconscious, shot Young in the hand and thigh and shot
Bonn several times. Bonn died as a result of the bullet wounds.
According to defendant, all three men did some target
shooting with the pistol during the journey over the side
roads. After making the last stop, Bonn proposed that the
three go swimming. Young and Bonn got undressed, and
defendant began to disrobe. Young took some pills that he
said were" better" than whiskey and offered one to defendant.
Both Bonn and Young made homosexual advances that defendant rejected. As he was showing Young the proper way
to load the pistol, something struck defendant and knocked
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him out.. When he regained consciollsness, deff>ndant saw that
Bonn had been shot to death and t.hat Young had been
wounded. Defendant offered no explanation for these circumstances other than that he might have done the shooting
unconsciously. Young then suggested that the scene be staged
to look like a robbery. He gave defendant all his valuables,
including two checks. They removed Bonn's wristwatch. Defendant left for Reno after Young had indicated that he
would tell the police that he and Bonn had been held up by
two strangers. Young's incentive for the false story was to
prevent police discovery of certain pills and other paraphernalia in his bag.
Defendant cashed the two checks in Reno by forging Young's
signature. He then went by plane to Oakland, using the name
William Boyd. He registered in an Oakland hotel as Morgan
York. The next day he went by plane to Portland, using the
name HM. York." He was apprehended in Portland on September 22, 1960, and was taken to the Nevada County jail.
He and several other prisoners broke jail, but were recaptured.
Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to give
his requested instruction concerning criminal intent. This
instruction, however, was given almost verbatim. 1
[1] Defendant contends that the court also erred in
SDefendant's requested instruction reads:
"An essential element of the crime of lI'"hich the defendant is accused
is intent, the law requiring that to constitute such a crime tbere must
exist a union or joint operation of criminal conduct and criminal intent.
However, this does not mean that one must intend all the consequences
of his conduct, or that be must know that such conduct is unlawful, to
be guilt,. of a public offense such as that charged against the de/eruJant
in this clJ8e. The intent to do the forbidden thing constitutes the
crinlinal intent. The lall'". requires that to be guilt,. of crime, one must
intend the conduct that fits the description of the crime and must engage
in that conduct knowingl,. and wilfull;y." (Italics added.)
The instruction given reads:
"An essential element of each crime of which the defendant is ac.eused
is intent, the law requiring that to constitute such a crime there must
exist a union or joint operation of criminal conduct and criminal intent.
However, this does not mean that one must intend all the consequences
of his conduct, or that he must know that such conduct is unlawful to
be guilt,. of a public offense such as that charged in Oount two 0/ the
iruJictment herein. The intent to do the forbidden thing constitutes the
criminal intent. The law requires that to be guilty of crime, one must
intend the conduct that fits the description of the crime and must engage
in that conduct knowingly and wilfully." (Italics added.)
The variation of the proposed instruction from that given appears
from a comparison of the words in italics. Dcfendant'8 suggestion that
the jury was misled by the reference in thc instruction given to Count
two of the indictment is without merit, inasmuch as the instruction
expressl,. applied to "each crime of wbich the defendant is accused .••. "
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instructing the jury that it must either acquit defendant of
the eharge of murdet: or find him guilty of murder in the first
degree. lIe reasons that the jury might conceivably llRve
found him innocent of robbery but criminally responsible for
nonn's death, and that under proper instructions he might
have been convicted of a lesser crime than murder in the first
degree. This possibility was foreclosed, however, by the jury's
verdict of guilty on the charge of robbery. There is no evidence
. in the record, as there was in People v. Carni1le, 41 Ca1.2d
384 [260 P.2d 16], that defendant formed the intent to commit
robbery, if at all, only after the fatal shooting. Young testified
that defendant killed Bonn during the course of the robbery.
Defendant testified that there was no robbery. Accordingly,
it is clear that in finding defendant guilty of both robbery and
murder the jury necessarily determined that the killing was
perpetrated during the commission of the robbery.
Defendant contends that the court erroneously admitted
certain extrajudicial declarations made by him. Sheriff Wayne
Brown testified for the prosecution on rebuttal that shortly
after his arrest in Portland defendant had stated that he had
forced Bonn and Young to disrobe and robbed them at gunpoint, but that he had been struck from behind and could not
explain his victims' wounds. Defendant urges that it was
improper to introduce this evidence through the testimony of
the sheriff; that no foundation was laid that the declarations
were voluntary; that it was improper to permit the introduction of the declarations in rebuttal; that the declarations could
only be used to impeach defendant; and that the court erroneously instructed the jury with respect to the declarations.
The testimony of the sheriff was admissible. [2] Oral
confessions and admissions, not in writing and signed by the
defendant, may be proved by the testimony of anyone who
was present and heard the declarations when they were made.
(People v. Luis, 158 Cal. 185, 193 [110 P. 580]; People v.
Cokahnour, 120 Cal. 253, 254 [52 P. 505] ; People v. Taylor,
59 Cal. 640, 651; People v. Ashcraft, 138 Cal.App.2d 820, 828
(292 P.2d 676] ; People v. Thompson, 133 Cal.App.2d 4, 9 [284
P.2d 39] ; see also Gray v. State, 181 Md. 439 [30 A.2d 744] ;
McBaine, California Evidence Manual, § 858, pp. 291-292; 2
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 361, pp. 68-69.)
[ 3] Sheriff Brown was specifically questioned as to th4
conditions under which defendant made the declarations.
There is ample evidence that they were voluntary. Defendant
made no objection to their admission. Indeed, when Sheriff
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Brown was questioned on this matter, counsel for defendant
rejected the prosecutor's invitation to examine the sheriff as to
whether defendant's declarations were voluntary. There is
no merit in defendant's contention that no foundation was
laid. (See People v. Byrd, 42 Ca1.2d 200,210 [266 P.2d 505].)
[ 4] Although the prosecution should have introduced this
evidence as part of its case in chief (see Pen. Code, § 1093;
People v. Oarter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 753 [312 P.2d 665]), it does
not appear that the order of proof prejudiced defendant.
There is no claim that there was any surprise, and even if
an objection had been made, the trial court would not have
abused its discretion by admitting the evidence in rebuttal.
(People v. Ohessman, 52 Ca1.2d 467, 493 [341 P.2d 679].)
[ 5 ] Furthermore," defendant is mistaken in his contention
that because the evidence of such statements was introduced
after he had taken the stand it could be considered only to
impeach defendant, not as proof of the People's case."
(People v. Chessman, supra, p. 493.)
[6] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
labeling his declarations a confession. The part of the instruction cited by defendant defines confessions. The remainder of
the instruction, however, goes on to define admissions. The
. court did not "label" defendant's declarations; but left to
the jury their classification, as well as the weight to be given
them regardless of their classification.
Defendant contends that the court gave an inaccurate definition of a confession. [7] A confession "leaves nothing
to be determined, in that it is a declaration of his [defendant's]
intentional participation in a criminal act." (People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555,568-569 [229 P. 341].) [8] An admission, on the other hand, is merely a recital of facts that "tend
to establish guilt." (People v. Schoon, 177 Cal. 678,683 [171
P. 680].) [9] The court instructed the jury that to be
considered a confession, a statement must be one "which, if
true, discloses his [defendant's] guilt of that crime and excludes the possibility of a reasonable inference to the contrary. " The court defined an admission as a declaration which,
"by itself, is not sufficient, even if true, to warrant an inference of guilt, but which tends to prove guilt when considered
with tIle rest of the evidence." The court was correct in
instructing the jury with respect to both confessions and
admissions, for defendant's del'larations might properly havc
been regarded as confessions to the crimes of robbery and
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assault with a deadly weapon, but merely admissions to the
charge of murder.
[10] Defendant correctly points out that the court erred
in instructing the jury that an admission could be considered,
even if involuntary. (People v. Trout, 54 Ca1.2d 576, 586
[6Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231] ; People v. Atchley, 53 Ca1.2d
160,170 [346 P.2d 764].) [11] This error was not prejudicial, however, for there is no substantial evidence in the
record to support defendant's contention that the declarations
were involuntary. Sheriff Brown testified that defendant's
answers were given freely and voluntarily. Defendant's testimony does not substantially contradict that of the sheriff:
Q. Were you forced to answer their questions T A. No.
Q. Was everything you said free and voluntary' A. Yes.
Q. They didn't threaten you with anything' A. In a way.
Q. Pardon me Y A. In a way.
Q. What did they threaten you with if anything T A. They
said if I would go along and play ball with them they would
make the trip as easy for 1ne as possible, I wouldn't be handcuffed on the train or if we went on a plane I wouldn't be
handcuffed. I said, "You would have to know me better."
I said, ' , You would know I have never been in any violence. "
Q. They didn't promise to do this on the basis of any particular story that you would tell Y A. They inferred that I would,how I answered the questions was how I would go back.
On redirect examination, defendant said: "I had the choice
of two, of answering some of these questions and going on
the train or by plane." Sheriff Brown testified that the discussion concerning the mode of travel from Portland to
Nevada City was wholly unrelated to defendant's answers to
the questions put. In view of the testimony of both defendant
and Sheriff Brown that the declarations were free and volunt.ary, it is not reasonably probable that the jury accepted
defendant's contention tbat they were induced by the discussion as to the mode of travel.
Defendant contends that misconduct of t.he prosecuting attorney deprived him of a fair trial. A number of instances
are relied upon to support the charge of misconduct. [12] In
only one instance, however, did defendant object. When the
prosecutor referred to defendant's having "stolen" the car
for the trip to Reno, defendant properly objected. The court's
correction of the prosecutor and indication to the jury that the
reference was improper precluded any prejudice tl1erefrom.
[13] Defendant complains that during his cross-examina-
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tion of defendant, the prosecutor implied that defendant had
lied to the owner of the car concerning the presence of the
murder weapon in the glove compartment; that the prosecutor
implied that defendant had stolen the gun from another friend;
and" that by his statements on several occasions, the prosecutor
evinced a personal dislike for or distrust of defendant. Any
impropriety in these instances could have been cured, upon
timely objection, by retraction of the prosecutor or instruction
of the court. (See People v. Berryman, 6 Ca1.2d 331, 337 [57
P.2d 136] ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [324 P.2d 556] ;
People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487,493 [218 P.2d 527]; People v.
Oaetano,29 Cal.2d 616, 619-620 [177 P.2d 1].)
[14] There is no merit in defendant's contention that
there was error because the prosecutor used the power of his
office to secure a daily transcript, whereas defendant was not
provided with such a transcript. Defendant was given a
transcript as soon as he requested it.
[16] Defendant complains that there were conversations
between jurors and spectators and members of the sheriff's
office before the submission of the case to the jury. The burden
of demonstrating improper influence and prejudice is upon
the defendant. (People v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 283 [232 P.
710].) Defendant does not know what the alleged conversa- "
tions were about, and it cannot be presumed that they related
to the trial or that the jurors were influenced by them.
(People v. Dunne, 80 Cal. 34, 36 [21 P. 1130].)
The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion
"for a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J.; McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
"and Dooling, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
13, 1961.

